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Abstract— We propose a geo-encryption protocol that allow 
mobile nodes to communicate securely by restricting the 
decryption of a message to a particular location and time period. 
Our protocol will handle the exchange of movement parameters, 
so that a sender is able to geo-encrypt messages to a moving 
decryption zone that contains a mobile node’s estimated location. 
We also present methods for estimating the node’s movement 
parameters to allow for geo-encryption.  Finally, we evaluate our 
model by measuring the induced overhead to the network and its 
performance in terms of decryption ratio. 
 
Index Terms— geo-encryption, location-based security, GPS-
based encryption 
I. INTRODUCTION 
PS-based encryption (or geo-encryption) is an 
innovative technique that uses GPS-technology to 
encode location information into the encryption keys 
to provide location based security. GPS-based encryption adds 
another layer of security on top of existing encryption 
methods by restricting the decryption of a message to a 
particular location and time period. Applying this technique to 
a mobile environment, with a dynamically changing topology, 
requires a protocol to handle the distribution of movement 
information so that communicating hosts can keep track of 
each others locations. Existing GPS-based encryption 
techniques ([3] and [4]) have limited support for mobile 
nodes, therefore, we propose a mobility model for existing 
geo-encryption techniques to allow mobile nodes to exchange 
movement parameters so that a sender is able to geo-encrypt 
messages to a moving decryption zone that contains a mobile 
node’s estimated location. We also simulate this protocol to 
find out its performance and scalability in a multi-hop 
network. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the 
geo-encryption model. Section III proposes a mobility model 
by introducing some movement parameters and the protocol 
required to set up and maintain a mobile geo-encrypted 
session. Section IV presents the model equations. Section V 
shows how to estimate and update the mobility parameters and 
how to achieve the model’s objectives.  Sections VI – IX 
present the simulation details. Section X concludes the paper. 
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II. DENNING’S MODEL OF GEO-ENCRYPTION 
 
 
Figure 1: Geo-encryption forces the receiving node (B) to be inside a pre-
defined location L to be able to decrypt the message. 
 
Denning’s model ([1], [2] and [3]) for adding security to 
transmissions uses location-based encryption to limit the area 
inside which the intended recipient can decrypt messages.  
Fig. 1 shows the general idea. A geo-locking function is 
employed during the encryption process to combine an 
encryption key with the recipient’s geographic location (L) to 
produce a “geo-secured” key for transmission alongside an 
encrypted message; the message can only be decrypted if the 
geo-secured key can be recovered, which can only be done if 
the recovering machine is physically positioned at location L.  
The sender also transmits parameters which define the shape 
of the area where decryption is permitted (the “decryption 
zone”), and the time period during which decryption can be 
accomplished. 
Denning’s model is effective when the sender of a message 
knows the recipient’s location L and the time that the recipient 
will be there, and can be applied especially effectively in 
situations where the recipient remains stationary in a well-
known location.  Denning recognizes that geo-encryption is 
also desirable in situations where the recipient is mobile, 
without a pre-planned itinerary.  All the sender needs is the 
recipient’s current/upcoming location and the time that the 
recipient will be there, and Denning notes that a velocity 
parameter (the recipient’s velocity) can be added to the geo-
locking function. However, we have not seen the details of 
mobility support in Denning’s geo-encryption model, and 
therefore we propose a model to provide for mobility when 
using GPS-based encryption. 
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III. THE MODEL 
 
We propose a mobility model based on the geo-encryption 
technique in [1] in which both sender and receiver are mobile, 
without preplanned itineraries, and can securely deliver their 
current locations to one another whenever necessary. In order 
to do this, each mobile node that will be receiving geo-
encrypted messages needs to inform potential sender nodes 
about its intended movement in order for a sender node to 
estimate the mobile node’s expected location at any point in 
time. This is done by sending information regarding the 
mobile node’s movement, which we call mobility parameters, 
to the sender via a sequence of message exchanges. The next 
two subsections explain these parameters, the protocols and 
the messages that need to be exchanged between a mobile 
receiver node and a stationary or a mobile sender node. 
 
A. Mobility parameters 
 
 
Figure 2: Diagram illustrating the four mobility parameters: velocity, 
direction, speed maneuverability, and breadth maneuverability.  
 
Let A be a mobile station (the moving agent) and let B be a 
stationary (base) station in a network using Denning-style 
geo-locking for an added layer of security. In our model, the 
geo-locking function takes shape, time, velocity, direction, 
and two maneuverability parameters.  The shape parameters 
define an ellipse as the decryption zone. An ellipse is suitable 
for the shape of our decryption zone because it has a length 
and breadth, and when both are equal, the ellipse becomes a 
circle that provides uniform coverage in all directions. (A 
rectangle also has a length and breadth, but when both are 
equal, it forms a square, with non-uniform coverage.)  The 
time parameter specifies the period during which decryption is 
possible. When A is in motion, B will need to calculate a time 
parameter that represents a future time when A will actually 
be in the decryption zone when a geo-encrypted message 
arrives for decipherment at A. 
Figure 2 shows the four mobility parameters that a mobile 
node uses to advertise its movement information. The velocity 
parameter, v , describes the recipient’s speed. This is the 
average speed at which the recipient is expected to travel. 
Velocity ( v ) is determined from observing the distance 
traveled during a specified time unit—it is automatically 
calculated from recent movement, not specified by a user.   
The direction parameter,θ , describes the direction in which 
the recipient is traveling and is measured as the positive angle 
between the positive x-axis and the velocity vector on a 
Cartesian coordinate system.   
 
The first maneuverability parameter,α , is an indication of 
how frequently the moving recipient might need to change 
speeds while traveling to the new destination (how much 
leeway, in terms of speed changes, that should be built into 
the size of the decryption zone).  This speed-maneuverability 
parameter influences the length of the ellipse-shaped 
decryption zone.  For travel on a commercial airliner at a fixed 
speed, this factor would be small, while for travel on a 
highway, where unexpected delays might crop up, it would 
probably be larger.   
The second maneuverability parameter, β , defines how 
much the moving recipient might deviate from a straight line 
while traveling to a new destination (how much “wiggle 
room” is deemed necessary, based on an assessment of the 
terrain being followed).  This parameter affects the breadth of 
the ellipse-shaped decryption zone, and we refer to it as the 
breadth-maneuverability parameter.  On a straight highway, or 
in an airplane, the breadth maneuverability factor will 
probably be small.  But in mountainous terrain, or while 
traveling on horseback or on a winding river, the breadth 
maneuverability factor will be larger. It may make more sense 
in the real world for a mobile station to define large 
maneuverability values for a single, long, winding and 
unpredictable move, rather than frequently computing a series 
of small directional and speed changes while following a 
crooked trail.  
A mobile station must determine its own velocity and 
maneuverability parameters, based on its recent movement 
and an evaluation of the terrain in question, and communicate 
them to other stations for use in geo-locking messages back to 
the moving station. 
The decryption zone only needs to be large enough for A to 
extract the geo-secured decryption key within the specified 
time period, not for A to decrypt the accompanying message. 
In the design of our model, we make several security and 
reliability assumptions: that routing is secure; that 
authentication is assured by protocols other than geo-
encryption; that the GPS hardware works flawlessly, is 
tamper-proof and unspoofable; that transmissions use some 
sort of spread spectrum method in order to counter 
triangulation attempts by rivals searching for our stations; and 
that rival electronic countermeasures do not jam our mobile 
stations’ transmitters (presumably in laptop computers). 
 
B. Movement Updates 
 
In the descriptions below, the notation )},({ LCE  means a 
message with contents C that are geo-encrypted to the 
geographical area L. Also, node A’s current location is labeled 
LA while node B’s current location is labeled LB in the 
descriptions: 
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One of the most important control messages in our mobility 
model is the movement update message. In order for the 
sender to keep track of the location and movement of the 
mobile receiver node, the receiver itself must accumulate 
information about its own ongoing movement and advertise it 
to the sender when necessary. Using the example where A is 
the mobile node and B is the stationary node, each time A’s 
change in velocity and direction is greater than a certain 
threshold (discussed in Section V), A sends its current 
movement parameters (v, θ , α , and β ), LA, and the current 
time t to B in a movement update message:  
 
)},,,,,,({ LBtLAvE βαθ  
 
Based on this information, node B can predict node A’s 
future location until A sends another movement update 
message to B. Because B will be estimating A’s location 
based on this movement information, there will be errors 
between the estimated and actual location of A. Therefore, LA 
and t are sent in the movement update message from A to B so 
that B can determine A’s future location knowing that A was 
at location LA at time t. Similarly, B has to know A’s initial 
location at the start of the mobile geo-encryption session (i.e., 
at time t = 0). 
IV. THE MODEL EQUATIONS 
 
Suppose the mobile node A starts at time t0 at a location whose 
longitude and latitude values are LA0 (X0,Y0), which are 
assumed to be initially known to node B. This could be 
achieved, for example, by using the geo-encryption model in 
[1], or by any other means. Periodically, node A collects GPS 
location satellite readings LAt ( Xt, Yt) at time t with 
K,,, 321 tttt =  such that idtti += 0  where d is a fixed 
time unit interval whose value is arbitrary but known. 
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Figure 3:  Movement of the decryption region depends on the initial values V0 
, θ0  and LA0 . 
 
To define the decryption region for the mobile node A, it is 
assumed that some initial values are available for the mobility 
parameters α0 , β0  V0 and θ0 at time t0. Given these initial 
values for the mobility parameters and LA0 (X0,Y0) as the 
initial values for the center of the ellipse, the decryption 
region for node A is defined initially by substituting these 
values in Eq. 2.  
The line of movement makes an angle θ0 with the positive 
direction of the latitude. As time progresses, the decryption 
region for node A moves along that line at a constant velocity 
V0 (Figure 3). The movement of node A itself is arbitrary in 
any direction and any velocity but otherwise restricted to the 
decryption region at all times. The parameters of the center of 
the decryption region constantly change with time but not the 
shape. The parameters of the shape of the region remain fixed 
and are only allowed to change when a predetermined fixed 
number n of time units has passed. The center (CXt,CYt) of 
the decryption region at time t is given by 
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Thus, at any time node B needs only the initial parameters 
and the time value t to locate the center of the decryption 
region. On the other hand, the shape of the region is 
determined by the maneuverability parameters α and β as well 
as the movement direction θ. If we assume the region has the 
bivariate normal distribution with center (CXt,CYt) and if we 
adopt the 3-sigma rule [13] then the equations relating the 
shape parameters of the region with the maneuverability 
parameters are given by  
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Hence, at time t, the decryption region is defined by: 
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where θρ cos=  and c is a constant determined from values 
of α and β. 
 
V. PARAMETER ESTIMATION AND UPDATE 
A. Estimating the Mobility Parameters 
 
Although the GPS readings were not needed to locate and 
determine the decryption region in the above equations, 
nevertheless they must be found to estimate and update the 
mobility parameters. The GPS readings LAt (Xt, Yt) at time 
K,,, 321 tttt =  are found and constantly used to calculate 
and update the velocity V, and the angle θ, of the decryption 
region. V and θ are the velocity and angle for movement along 
the line of movement. These values will be used to update the 
 
 
4
initial values V0 and θ0 each time the region changes its 
direction or velocity. In such an event, we also update the 
initial values α0 , β0 using the last n GPS readings (Xt, Yt) 
using the Gauss-Markov model given by 
 
L,3,2,11)1( 121 =−+−+= −− tZZ ttt εγµγγ  
 
where 10 ≤≤ γ  is a tuning parameter representing different 
levels of randomness, µ is the asymptotic mean of Zt, and tε  
are uncorrelated stationary random Gaussian process with 
zero mean and unknown standard deviation σ. Notice that 
when γ equals to 1 the model is identical to random walk 
model, and when γ  equals to zero the model is the constant 
velocity fluid flow model. In applications one may select the 
value of γ  arbitrary or could be estimated from the data. The 
model is described more fully in [9] and [10]. Assuming that 
both the velocity and the angle of the mobile node follow the 
model, and taking the asymptotic means of velocity and angle 
equal, respectively, to their initial values 0V and 0θ , the 
estimates of velocity and the angle from the kth period are 
obtained as 
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Notice that the kth period starts at time )1( −knt and ends at 
time 1−nkt .  
 We obtain the formulas for estimating α and β by inverting 
the formulas in (equations 2) to get 
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B. Updating the Mobility Parameters 
 
Each time the mobility parameters are estimated, the mobile 
node must decide whether or not to replace the old values of 
the parameters with the new values and whether or not to 
advertise them. Typically, the old values are replaced with the 
new values and the updates are advertised only when they are 
significant i.e. when the difference between the old and the 
new values of a parameter exceeds some predetermined 
threshold set by the mobile node.  Otherwise, the old values 
are kept and nothing advertised. 
In addition to the mobility parameters, the initial location 
parameters (X0, Y0) of the mobile node must also be updated 
once either or both of V or θ are found significant. This is 
because the geo-encryption process depends on determining 
the center (CXt, CYt) and, as noted from Eq.1, the recipient 
needs (X0, Y0) to estimate the center.  If at time t* a significant 
V or θ is detected then not only the four mobility parameters 
are advertised but also the new value for t0 which is estimated 
by *0ˆ tt = .  Given the values of tV ˆ and,ˆ,ˆ θ the recipient 
will use Equation 1 to estimate the updated initial 
location )ˆ,ˆ( 00 YX . 
The smaller the threshold values for the parameters the 
more often   the parameters are updated and advertised. So, 
choosing optimal threshold values is the key in optimizing the 
decryption zone to achieve a balance between the probability 
the mobile node falls inside the decryption zone against the 
frequency of movement updates and advertisements. 
 
C. Optimizing the Decryption Zone 
 
The proposed model attempts to achieve the following goals: 
1) capture the locations of other mobile stations within a given 
decryption region with high probability, 2) keep stations 
locations secret from rivals, and 3) permit the stations to be as 
mobile and maneuverable as possible.  These three goals are 
in conflict and thus we need to make certain compromises in 
the design.  For the present model, more mobility is gained at 
the expense of position secrecy and area of the decryption 
region.   
In order to minimize the frequency with which nodes 
advertise their movements and at the same time optimize the 
size of the decryption zone, we propose the following:  
A mobile node may fall into one of three regions as shown 
in Figure 4. Region 1 represents the “advertisement-free” 
zone, meaning that a mobile node will not advertise movement 
updates when they fall within this region although it 
constantly updates them. The size of this zone is determined 
by the 2-sigma rule similar to the 3-sigma rule used to define 
the decryption zone R(x,y) in equation 3. Hence, it is obtained 
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by replacing 6 by 4 in equations 2. Based on the bivariate 
normal distribution assumption, the probability of falling in 
this zone is about 95% provided that the center of the region is 
determined according to equations 1.  Regions 1 and 2 
together make up the decryption zone.  In region 2, the mobile 
node is about to leave the decrypt zone and enters the non-
decrypt zone of region 3. In this zone, the node needs to 
transmit its mobile parameters updates if they are significant. 
They are declared significant when the updates in the mobility 
parameters exceed the parameters thresholds.  Note that by 
restricting advertisement of updates to region 2 we effectively 
reduce the frequency of advertisements. 
 
 
 
 
Region 1 
Region 2 
Region 3 
 
Figure 4: Regions 1, 2, and 3 for optimizing the decryption zone. 
 
VI. PROTOCOL OVERVIEW 
 
Our protocol builds on top of existing wireless multi-hop 
routing protocols, thus we will not address the routing issues 
of mobile multi-hop networks. We evaluated a simplified 
version of the Geo-encryption protocol by simulating a 
modified DSR protocol [11] using ns-2 under selected 
scenarios (section VII). Our protocol will handle the 
communication of movement information between mobile 
nodes and the updating of this information whenever nodes 
move unexpectedly. It aims to allow mobile nodes to 
communicate their movement information accurately while at 
the same time reducing the overhead on the network. 
When a mobile node, say MB1, wishes to communicate 
with another node MB2, it broadcasts a message to discover a 
route to MB2. When such a route exists, node MB1 will 
receive a route reply specifying the sequence of hops to reach 
node MB2. In our model, it will also need to know the 
position of the destination node. 
This is meant to simulate a Geo-encryption model in a 
mobile network. Node MB1 will need to keep a table of the 
positions of the nodes it intends to send data to. The table will 
be kept current with position update messages from these 
nodes. Each node can obtain and send its coordinates to 
correspondent nodes using a position update message. The 
destination node MB2, upon receipt, will map its true position 
to the intended location of the message using the shape 
parameters (discussed in [1]). If the result of the mapping 
matches the location sent by MB1, the decryption will be 
considered successful else the message will be dropped. We 
will simplify this model to test if the node is within a given 
square centered on the received coordinates. 
 
VII. SIMULATION MODEL 
 
We decided to make the position update aspect of the protocol 
be reactive similarly to DSR routing. To simulate geo-
encryption using DSR we made the following assumption:  
 
1. Authentication is present and free: the establishment of 
communication between two nodes is assumed 
authenticated and anytime encryption fails the 
authenticated relationship is assumed reestablished 
automatically by the position update message. 
2. Decryption of the message is assumed part of another 
layer. Our simulations are only concerned with position 
updates; if the message contains the right position 
parameters x and y to a certain tolerance +/- Tolerance, 
the message is considered decrypted. 
3. Flow state in DSR was disabled to allow every message 
to carry its source route. 
4. DSR control messages like route discovery messages are 
not subject to encryption and are not tested for it. 
 
When a message is received by its destination node, if none 
of its protocol flags are set (RouteRequest, RouteReply, 
PositionUpdate), the node gets its own real X and Y values 
(GPS) and compares them to the x and y values in the packet 
header. If x ∈ [ Xreal ± Tolerance] and y ∈[ Yreal ± 
Tolerance] the message is considered decrypted otherwise the 
message is considered not decrypted and the packet is passed 
to GeoHandler, a function that responds to decryption failures. 
GeoHandler is also called if the message is decrypted but its 
coordinates are not within half the tolerance (x ∈ [ Xreal ± 
Tolerance/2] and y ∈[ Yreal ± Tolerance/2]) this is meant to 
preempt future decryption failures. 
GeoHandler constructs a message, puts the real X and Y 
values in the x and y fields, sets the Position Update Flag and 
sends the message on the reverse route that the received 
message arrived on. 
When a message is received and it has its Position Update 
Flag set, it is not tested for decryption but is used to update the 
table entries corresponding to the source node that sent the 
message. This makes our Geo encryption protocol totally on 
demand and should only have overhead when decryption 
failures occur. 
To evaluate the protocol we added lines to the trace file 
indicating the following events: 
• A message was successfully decrypted. 
• A message failed decryption. These would give a 
metrics of the protocol performance. 
• A Position Update Message was sent. 
• A position Update Message was received. These 
would allow us to gauge the overhead of the protocol 
on regular DSR. 
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VIII. MOBILITY FILE AND SIMULATION RUNS: 
 
We used a subset of bus routes from the Seattle area as our 
mobility file [12]. First we plotted the data for one of the files 
at our disposal and, after proper unit conversion, determined a 
1500x1500 m area that presented dense traffic. We then 
selected the movements of buses within that area during a 15 
minute period (simulation target time). Furthermore we 
excluded from that selection the buses that came to close to 
the edge of our area (150 m) to avoid sudden node 
disappearances during the simulation. And finally, from the 
remaining data, we selected the 50 buses with the most 
number of updates in the given period (see Figure 5). From 
that we created an initial position file and movements file with 
TCL commands to include in our simulation file. We also 
included different pause times between movement updates to 
create several movement files with decreased mobility; the 
pause times are 10, 25, 50, 75, 100, 200, 400, 650 and 900 
seconds. Movements updates that exceeded 900 seconds were 
purged from the files, thus in effect the 900 second pause time 
corresponds to zero mobility when all the nodes stay at their 
original positions. 
 
Figure 5: Final simulation data 
 
We used ns-2.28 for our simulations, running DSR with 
flow state disabled and the modifications described above. 
For each one of the mobility files we did three runs with 10 
sender 10 receivers, 20 sender 20 receivers and 30 sender 30 
receivers. Every sender sent data at a Constant Bit Rate CBR 
of 4 packets per seconds with a packet size of 256 bytes.  
 For each run we recorded the decryption ratio and the 
protocol overhead.  
We measured our decryption ratio as the ratio of 
successfully decrypted messages amongst those that were 
received. Thus the ratio does not reflect the delivery ratio of 
DSR. We measure the protocol overhead for position updates 
as the ratio of position update messages to the total number of 
data messages (CBR), decrypted or not that were received. A 
better measure would have been the ratio of generated 
position update messages to the total number of messages on 
the network including DSR messages as this is a modification 
to DSR.  
 
IX. SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
With the tolerance fixed to 10 m and running for 10, 20 and 
30 senders and receivers respectively, we note that the general 
trend is, as expected, that the decryption ratio falls with an 
increase in mobility (i.e. the ratio increases with bigger pause 
times). See Figure 6. This is due to the fact that higher 
mobility means that nodes move more often away from their 
perceived positions at the sending nodes. As a result more 
messages are not decrypted. 
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Figure 6: Decryption ratio vs. mobility for 10, 20, and 30 CBR sources 
 
Also from Figure 6 we can see that an increase in CBR 
senders and receivers results in a decrease in decryption. That 
can be explained by the increased delay in message delivery 
due increase network congestion. If a message is buffered 
often along the way, it allows time to the destination node to 
move further away from its current position and thus increase 
the change of a decryption failure. This is confirmed by the 
fact that at low mobility, the gap between the ratios of the 
three cases is reduced. A noticeable feature of the graph is 
also the fast dip for pause times between 0 and 100 seconds. 
We have yet to explain it.    
On the other hand, overhead decreases with increased pause 
times. See Figure 7. This behavior is typical of a protocol that 
is reactive to movement. If there is no movement then there is 
no need for movement updates. The overhead does not quite 
go to zero at zero mobility because in our simulation, nodes 
do not initially know the positions of their destinations but 
have to learn them by sending the default coordinates (-1,-1) 
and causing a position update message. 
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Figure 7: Protocol overhead vs. mobility for 10, 20, and 30 CBR sources 
 
We can also see that in general, overhead increases with an 
increase in CBR senders and receivers. This must follow from 
the drop in decryption ratio discussed previously as every 
failed decryption or near failed (not within half tolerance) 
generates an update message and thus increases the overhead 
of the protocol. By the same token, the initial increase in 
overhead for small pause times compared to zero is a result of 
the equivalent behavior of the decryption ratio in Figure 6.  
We do not consider the drop of the overhead of the 20 CBR 
below that of 30 CBR, to be significant. We believe it to be an 
artifact that would disappear if we ran more simulations. 
 
For our second series of simulations, we used our base case 
of 10 senders and 10 receivers to test the effect of changing 
the tolerance. First we compared the decryption ratio of our 
reference tolerance of 10 to that of a more restrictive tolerance 
of 3 meters. The results over the usual pause times going from 
0 to 900 seconds can be seen in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Decryption ratio vs. mobility for tolerance of 3 and 10 
 
The value of the tolerance sets the size of the decryption 
square. Thus a more restrictive tolerance will result to a 
smaller square and lower decryption ratios as seen in the 
figure. 
This trend can be further seen in Figure 9 where we show 
the results of increasing the tolerance through 5, 10, 20, 50, 70 
and 100 meters for the maximum mobility case and with 10 
CBR sources. As expected, decryption increases with more 
slack tolerances, that ratio would not reach 100% though due 
to the need to establish the knowledge of the initial positions.  
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Figure 9: Decryption ratio vs. tolerance for 10 CBR sources 
 
In a similar behavior, the overhead drops rapidly with 
increased tolerance down to the minimum required for the 
initial position messages and remains constant after a certain 
point. That behavior is mostly dependent on the range of 
motion of the buses during the simulation. If it does not 
exceed half of the given tolerance then no movement updates 
are required for the life of the simulation.  
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Figure 10:  Protocol overhead vs. tolerance 
 
The exponential shape can be explained by the possibility 
that a lot of buses have a limited range of motion and the 
slightest increase in tolerance is sufficient to cover their entire 
or most of their path and make updates unnecessary while a 
few buses have larger ranges of motion and will be affected 
only by a large increase in the tolerance. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
 
Using geo-encryption adds a significant layer of security to 
network transmissions.  Mobile networks should be able to 
take advantage of this technique.  We believe that our model 
serves a source for further work on location-based security for 
mobile networks.  In our proposal, mobile nodes which stray 
from their advertised locations can reestablish a secure status 
within the network at the same time do not sacrifice the 
secrecy of their locations. We evaluated a simplified version 
of the Geo-encryption protocol by measuring the induced 
overhead to the network and its decryption performance by 
simulating a modified DSR protocol using ns-2 under selected 
scenarios. Our results proved some of our expectations about 
decryption decline with increase in mobility and an equivalent 
increase in overhead. We also saw some results we did not 
predict such as the decrease in decryption ratio with an 
increase of network traffic due to increased message queuing 
delay.  
Finally we can point certain steps to improve the 
performance of the protocol as next position prediction at the 
sender or the receiver based on history of movement, or the 
sending of movement parameters such as speed and direction 
by the receiver to the sender. And for improved security we 
can extend our protocol to a multi-hop encryption scheme that 
would require the sender to have knowledge of the position of 
all the forwarding nodes. 
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